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Abstract:
In the past decades the involvement of local experts in the planning and evaluation of 
development programs has steadily increased. Ownership of development planning is 
propagated as major aim of bilateral and international development co-operation. Yet, the 
quality and performance of many local experts is still open to question, last but not least, 
because they share the same technocratic bias as quite a number of their Western 
counterparts, notably concerning pro-poor development policies, empowerment and ill-
adapted technology transfer. An unreserved replacement of expatriates by local experts, or 
the substitution of technical assistance by unconditioned budget aid would be counter-
productive with respect to poverty-oriented development policies.
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1. Roots of the fashionable call for local experts
In recent years the call for an increasing involvement of local experts in planning and evaluation of 
development projects has steadily increased (1). This applies to sub-Saharan Africa too, although it 
may be considered a special case: first, because of the considerable dependency of African states 
(most of them LLDCs) on development aid (high "aid ratio" compared with GNP or state budget), and 
second, because it is said that consulting and management qualifications are relatively low developed 
in Africa, compared with Asia or Latin America. Nevertheless there exist a growing pressure by Afri-
can governments and NGOs vis à vis foreign donors to employ more local experts. This demand has 
increasingly been considered as justified, not just by churches or other NGOs, but even by major 
donor agencies of official development aid, out of the following reasons:
- All parties concerned share - at least rhetorically - the same basic aims and policies of 
development co-operation, i.e. self-reliance, guarantee of sustainability of development projects 
by the use of indigenous resources, the principle of subsidiarity of aid, and last not least the 
desire to learn from one-another; therefore, an equal or even predominant part concerning 
employment of local experts has been demanded.
- As a rule of thumb, on average half of the aid-money has been spent in the past for salaries of 
expatriate technical staff. Therefore the political pressure by both donors and recipient 
countries for a major stake of local experts in development projects can not be over-heard. For 
African governments and radical Western liberal economists alike, the best would even be to 
substitute "technical" by "financial" co-operation", i.e. to transfer finance directly to recipient 
governments or NGOs on which the latter could decide independently. International donor 
agencies are increasingly responsive to these demands, not just because of shared common aims 
(see above), but also because of "economies" of employing "cheap" local experts in view of 
stagnant financial resources and growing criticism of the ineffectiveness of development aid. 
- Since at least two decades, local experts are increasingly recognized and used (by the 
international donor community) as "door openers" for their expatriate counterparts, because of 
their intimate knowledge of the socio-cultural and political setting of their home-country, and 
because of their personal affiliation to major decision makers in domestic governmental or 
implementing agencies. Therefore they are considered to be an indispensable part of any 
international planning- or evaluation team.
- The offer in (by international standards) qualified local development experts is growing, even in 
many least developed countries in Africa. However, as in these countries there does not yet 
exist an effective independent domestic demand for the services of local experts, the latter are 
1) cf. Jaycox (1993); Braun (1993); Hampel (1993). By "local experts" we understand national experts who live 
and work in the country where they are meant to do their expertise. "international experts" (expatriates) by 
contrast are those experts, employed outside the borders of their homeland; i.e. Africans, too, may either be 
"local" or "international" experts, depending on their qualification and contract.
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still to a great degree dependent on contracts of foreign donor agencies. Therefore, "locals" are 
trying to compete on the same terms with foreign international development experts.
- In addition local experts - as any other professionals in the world - are keen to reserve a greater 
part out of the "cake" of the consulting market in LLDCs (financed by the international donor 
community) for themselves.
- Local experts of African LDCs (e.g. Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria) are gradually gaining bargaining 
power in doing consulting for foreign donor agencies, both at local and international level. 
This, however, is not just due to growing individual qualification, but it may be considered as 
well as the effect of corporate strategies of the concerned, i.e. of creating professional 
organisations and pressure groups and/or by advocating "closed shops", in delimitation against 
expatriates as well as against the so-called "pirates" in the business, i.e. unorganized local 
competitors, said to be unqualified by international standards or suspected to offer their servi-
ces at dumping prices. Concerning this political or other lobbying the backing of their demands 
by African governments may be taken for granted, as the network of clientelism in African 
countries is for specific socio-cultural reasons even more effective than in Western countries.
2. On the socio-cultural setting of local experts
The social structure and the socio-cultural setting in most African developing countries has been 
dominated since colonial times by clientelism, patronage, the socio-economic system of the 
"command state" and prebend economy. Even the second wave of democratization, experienced since 
about three years in African countries, will not change this situation in the short run. There are 
indicators that even in model cases like in Benin Republic, corruption and nepotism among the new 
elected elite are on the contrary still increasing (cf. Engels et al 1994: 2 - 10). This may have strong 
repercussions on the work of local development experts. First, because local experts belong as a rule 
to the upper social strata of the society or the "intelligentsia", and they often share the same socio-
cultural background as the new breed of the political class of "technocrats", dominating many of the 
new democratically elected governments, like in Benin, Senegal or Côte d'Ivoire. These experts are 
deeply rooted in this socio-cultural system, therefore they too must honour the demands of clientelism 
and the prebend economy, otherwise they are threatened by economic and social sanctions. These 
sanctions are related to the degree of disrespect of established "traditional" rules of solidarity vis à vis
their own extended family, ethnical- or peer group; already the threat of sanctions, has to be con-
sidered as especially effective, because these threats apparently still exert by fare greater power in 
African countries than in most other developing countries, extending even into the realm of 
supernatural threats (e.g. magic and witchcraft; cf. Kohnert 1994). In view of such a considerable 
social and economic pressure the independence of judgement and action of local experts is supposed 
to be seriously affected and endangered in cases of conflict between their role as expert and their role 
within the clientele system in which they are embedded. Second, experts in general are supposed to 
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have a certain distortion of judgement or blinkers vis à vis the analysis of their own society; given the 
social background of local experts in African LDCs (see above), we have to pose the question, 
whether many of them are not exposed to even greater bias in relation to certain basic problems of 
development planning (e.g. recognition of problems of gender, of human rights or of the definition 
concept the "poor"). Local experts sometimes are less target-group and poverty oriented because they 
have to honour their obligations vis à vis political or administrative decision makers in their country. 
They may be even less accepted by the poor because the latter consider them to be part of the 
suppressive state structure. Even though expatriate experts more often than not do share the same 
status barriers in communication with the poor, and do have the disadvantage of not being able to talk 
to the target-groups without an interpreter, they often profit from the fact that they are not involved in 
local political, ethnic or religious antagonisms, as may be the case, e.g. of a Yoruba consultant doing 
interviews on sensitive issues with Hausa peasants in the North of Nigeria. Third, according to own 
experience in West Africa, local experts in African LLDCs are especially liable to back outdated 
development theories, like theories of modernisation, relying principally on the transfer of technology. 
This point is made not at all to assert that the undue reliance on concepts of technology transfer has 
been already eradicated within the circles of the international expert community. But professional 
blindness, e.g. vis à vis indigenous innovations by African peasants and peasant experimentation, is 
especially difficult to overcome in the presence of vested interests in accelerated growth according to 
the lines of western development, this holds even more, if experts should be interested not just in the 
transfer of technology, but also in the transfer of equipment, inputs, and finance, incorporated in this 
technology and benefiting more or less directly the upper class to which they belong (cf. 
Kohnert/Weber 1991). We have to stress once and again, all this has nothing to do with the lack of 
academic or intellectual qualification, therefore the biases mentioned above are (if at all) difficult to 
eliminate by training-programs for the promotion of local experts.
3. On the self-esteem of local experts
Quite a lot of local experts in Africa are nowadays - according to their own opinion - as qualified and 
independent as their expatriate colleagues. However, there still exist formal and informal market 
barriers, which prevent fair and equal competition on the international market. These barriers have to 
be removed by the international donor community. In addition more stress should be put on 
"professionalism"; notably the so-called "pirates" should be thrown out of business by giving 
contracts only to experts honouring professional codes of conduct and/or belonging to corporate 
professional organisations. Compared with their international competitors, local experts, according to 
their own point of view, dispose of special advantages, especially their familiarity with local 
languages, the socio-cultural setting, and indigenous innovations; in addition they consider themselves 
more accepted by implementing agencies as well as by target groups (cf. the "S.W.E.T." - Model by 
Mbagathi 1993).
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African experts see their major disadvantage, compared with their Western colleagues, in the lack of 
equipment, capital, and of international experience, insufficient training and insufficient access to 
donors. The assertion of special ideological or other biases on the part of local consultants is 
countered by the argument that the donors are the one who draft the terms of reference of contracts, 
and that local experts do just what they are asked to do; i. e. the blame, if accepted at all, is put back 
on the donors in a rather technocratic interpretation of their work which seems to be even more 
widespread among African than among Western experts.
4. Past experience with local experts
4.1 The view of foreign donors and expatriate counterparts
Rhetorically both donors and expatriates alike propagate the view that local experts should be treated 
on an equal footing with their foreign counterparts. In practice, however, local counterparts are still 
today most often used in Africa as "door opener" or as "junior brother", i.e. assistant, and they are 
treated and paid accordingly. Mainly two reasons are given for this. First, experience showed in the 
past that the service of local experts was not very reliable. Often - it is said - they did not honour the 
terms of reference of their contract, did not deliver the report in time (or not at all), and even if they 
delivered, the quality of the report and analysis was rather low. Although these assertions are certainly 
exaggerated in the interest of fencing the market, there may be a grain of truth in it. To begin with, 
local experts themselves readily admit that there still is a great need of training and further 
qualification in almost all African countries. But they maintain as well that local experts are generally 
badly paid, and even in case they should receive a good salary, they would have to give part of it to 
their "patrons", and/or they have to honour the demands of their extended family. As they are 
therefore always obliged to look for secondary sources of income, they are mostly short of time; in 
addition they may held the view that it is only fair, if they work according to pay, i.e. low quality for 
low payment, both measured by international standards. The low payment, and here we come to our 
second point, is at least partly explained by donor agencies with the situation on the domestic labour 
market in African LDCs, were they are advised by governments and national NGOs alike not to pay 
too high salaries in order to prevent distortions of the local salary structure.
4.2 The view of implementing (partner) organisations
The view of the implementing agencies corresponds to a great deal to the view of the local experts, 
with one or two important distinctions. Local governments and NGOs do want donors to pay more for 
"institution building" and "human capital development" in general, i.e. for training of staff on all 
levels in order to reduce dependency on external expertise, whether local or foreign. In addition 
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national partners of bilateral official aid urge international donors to replace technical cooperation by 
direct transfer of aid money in order to be able to employ their own national consultants, if it should 
proof to be necessary. And finally most partners overseas (especially from the NGO sector) want 
foreign donors to respect the national wage structure, and not to create an artificial demand which 
siphons away the best qualified manpower and contributes to the already severe brain drain in Africa.
4.3 The view of target groups
Empirical studies on the perspective "from below", i.e. the view of the target-groups, of relative 
advantages of employment of local or expatriate experts in development projects in Africa are still 
scarce. However, available evidence points in the direction that expatriate volunteers and experts are 
often seen as a positive anti-stereotype to national project staff (cf. Elwert-Kretschmer/Elwert 1991: 
342 - 349). Out of bad experience with failed development projects in Africa over the past two or 
three generations, target-groups are in general quite sceptical concerning innovations and 
recommendations of both white or black experts. Therefore they are mainly interested in the transfer 
of inputs and credit down to the grass-roots. In this respect the "white" expert as a rule is hold to be 
the direct responsible to be addressed to, sometimes he is even considered to be a more impartial 
broker of development aid than his "junior colleague", the local expert, who may be exposed to the 
suspicion - on the part of the villagers - of siding with those representatives of the state or the political 
class who are mainly interested in exploiting the peasantry.
5. The quest for a new division of labour between local and international experts
In view of the points made above, an unconditioned assistance of training and employment of local 
counterparts - as suggested by Jaycox (1993) and others - would be counter-productive with respect to 
target-group and poverty orientated development policies. Under the prevailing socio-cultural 
conditions of clientelism, the command state and the prebend economy in Africa, such a policy would 
even increase disallocation of project funds, it would probably spread corruption and nepotism and 
thus promoting social differentiation rather than alleviating poverty; in short, such a policy would 
neither be effective nor sustainable. The negative effects of such a policy would even multiply, if 
donors would agree to recent demands of radical Western and African scientists (cf. Hampel 1993:19) 
of replacing technical assistance by budget aid, to enable indigenous implementing agencies to 
employ local experts in line with their proper aims and interests.
What would be required now instead, is an increased but conditioned technical cooperation which 
would meet the requirements of the overall aims of poverty alleviation and self-reliance. For this 
effect we recommend a new division of labour between local and international experts according to 
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the comparative advantages of both groups: Local experts should concentrate on consultancy for and 
in the interest of the target-groups and be trained, paid, and employed accordingly. International 
experts (including qualified Africans) should concentrate on technical and management consultancy 
for international donors and national implementing organisations (African governments and NGOs). 
In order to prevent a further consolidation of the "two tiers society of consultants" of the past, it 
should be looked at that local experts are not any longer misused just as "door openers" for their 
expatriate senior colleagues. The task of consulting target-groups is a very demanding task, both 
concerning professional qualification as moderator and facilitator and technical knowledge as well as 
concerning physical and psychological stress of working and living under depriving local conditions 
together with the poor. At present very few local, and probably even less foreign experts, do have 
these qualifications as well as the will to do this job. A great deal of training, and may be even a kind 
of "brain washing" would be necessary to create a pool of this new breed of target-group consultants. 
In order to find consultants really qualified, independent of their patronage network, and dedicated to 
this task, it has to be valued and paid accordingly, that is at least as much as that of international 
experts. However, the tricky problem of interference in the domestic salary structure remains still 
unsolved. In view of a target-group and poverty orientated development policy the relationship 
between local and international experts should be reversed: consultant-teams should be directed by 
target-group specialists responsible for the general orientation of the project or program, international 
experts should assist them concerning planning or evaluation of implementation of the program.
For the time being these propositions are still far from realization because of too much counteracting 
vested interests of nearly all parties involved. As international experts Africans have still to cope with 
informal barriers to access to decision makers of major international donors, and it would be 
unrealistic to expect radical changes in this respect in the near future. Therefore it will be difficult for 
them to compete with their Western colleagues in this realm of consultancy. However, concerning 
consulting target-groups there exist still an unexplored market in which local experts would dispose of 
considerable comparative advantages vis à vis expatriates, if they only could overcome the barriers of 
elite-thinking and of clientelism. Why not assisting them in taking advantage of this situation in 
promoting market differentiation and -development in the above indicated direction ? Networks like 
ILEIA, financed by the Dutch government, the French Réseau Recherche-Développement, or the 
recent promotion of an African counterpart of a big rural regional integrated development project, 
assisted by German official development aid, as director of a German GTZ-team in a neighbouring 
African country are first encouraging examples in the right direction.
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